Abstract: Recent welfare reform has resulted in new work requirements for welfare recipients. These measures need to be justied, as they impair recipients' freedom. This paper rst repudiates economic justications for these developments and argues that the dominant justication is perfectionist. But unlike workfare, perfectionism is not necessarily paternalistic. The second part of the paper outlines a liberal perfectionism which allows only for autonomy-enhancing politics. Though even such autonomyenhancing politics cannot be made obligatory. The last section concludes that workfare's paternalism cannot be attributed to perfectionist justications, but rather stems from the narrow philosophy of work that is applied. The idea that enforced wage labour is a reliable tool for inducing autonomy is refuted. In the end, workfare needs to be rejected, as it is based on assumptions that are mistaken both normatively and empirically.
Introduction
When discussing`work and justice' one of the most obvious topics in political philosophy is workfare. There are at least two reasons for this: First, arguing in relation to the concept of justice, claims of justice have usually been addressed to the welfare state. In recent years this institution was`transformed', and some scholars now refer to the`workfare state' instead (Peck 2001) . While this change is often considered a topic for empirical disciplines such as political theory (Grell 2008) , philosophy cannot ignore this signicant change either, since it has changed the whole`philosophy of welfare '. 1 Second, arguing in relation to the concept of work, theoretically the transformation is also based on specic assumptions about work. Why has one notion of work been privileged over others? The`real world' of the working population is considerably aected by transformations such as these (competition in the labour market has increased, wages are falling, hours becoming longer). These work-related changes call for philosophical reection, too.
However, in spite of the urgency of such reection, only ve years ago Elizabeth Anderson rightly observed that philosophy is ignoring the changes workfare brings with it.
2 It is this lack I want to address. After I shortly explain 1 See the state of Alaska's statement, e.g.: http://www.hss.state.ak.us/dpa/features/org/ mission.htm.
2 It is high time that philosophers considered it. Yet it is nearly invisible in standard what workfare means, I will analyse the most important legitimation narrative for the transformation`from welfare to work' (1). This narrative is not economic. As it turns out, it is, in philosophical terms, perfectionist. But the political philosophy of perfectionism is contested, especially concerning its compatibility with liberalism. Therefore, after I briey explain what perfectionism means, I
will reconsider this question (2). While scholars are still divided on the issue, I argue that though perfectionism is reconcilable with liberalism, this does not allow for a legitimation of workfare. In order to explain why it is not resisted more strongly I nally outline the social philosophy that underlies the (mistaken) perfectionist justication of workfare (3). Proponents of workfare argue under narrow premises about the meaning of work. These assumptions are, so I argue, untenable. A proper understanding of liberal perfectionism and work in our societies can only lead to a rejection of workfare. It is incompatible with both liberalism and perfectionism.
Reasons for Workfare
Due to its formative powers, work is usually considered one of the constitutive components of modern society. I see at least three reasons for this prominence:
First, it produces the goods and services everybody needs to survive; second, the division of labour in society is structuring our societies to a large extend; third, a working person may also be enriched by work with`immaterial resources' such as self-esteem, recognition-respect or even a reason for being (Elster 1986) .
Nonetheless not everybody is working. This again has various reasons, some anthropological, some social. A prime anthropological reason is the life-cycle.
There are stages in life where human beings cannot work (and in civilized societies usually do not): childhood and youth, child-bearing, and old age. Another anthropological reason is that work, perceived as productive activity in the economic sphere (in our societies this is in most cases wage labour), is not the only valuable activity. Bodies need rest for their physical regeneration, people need leisure time for their psychic balance, societies need festivities and other cultural activities in order to recreate and develop their cultural identity. All of this cannot be produced by work in the economic sphere, but rather is consumed by it.
In short, both individuals and society need some time o (Russell 1932; Pieper 1948) .
Alongside these basic limits to work there are social reasons why some people do not work. People might either be unwilling to work, because they are independently wealthy or due to a preference for other activities (travelling, reading or writing, composing, socialising or heavy drinking, for example). Or people might be unable to work, due to an illness, for want of skills, orand this is the prime reason in our societiesfor lack of jobs. Industries might decline, crises may occur or qualications may change. These factors are beyond the control of individuals. Whatever the reasons in a particular case, there is always a part of the population which is (temporarily or permanently) not working. Given that the common funds that were available in traditional societies (Polanyi 1944 3 In political terms,`welfare' means that industrial societies, blessed with ever-increasing wealth, redistribute some of their privately appropriated resources to the nonworking population.
If the state arranges this redistribution we speak of`welfare states'. The term welfare' does not only refer to the wellbeing of individuals who receive thesè benets'. It also means the ourishing of the social body itself (`general welfare').
If it protects its members from starvation and grants them a decent life, even if they (for whatever reason) do not work, the social body can be said to`fare well':
Nobody needs to be afraid of suering economic destitution and social cohesion is operative. Scholars from T. H. Marshall (1950) onwards have seen this as an achievement in`social rights'.
Whatever the motive behind the welfare state, its function is best described by Goodin (1985) as`protecting the vulnerable'. However it has often worried philosophers that there was no single normative foundation for the welfare statesit was justied by various moral ideals like compassion, solidarity, economic justice or a moral right to freedom from want (Moehle 2001; Kaufmann 2003) . This also varied from country to country (Esping-Andersen 1990).
Now it is this social formation that has been`transformed ' (Seeleib-Kaiser 2008 the potential`wounds' from which they were meant to be protected (the labour market) is now interpreted as a cure to what ails them. In order to be legitimate this`new' philosophy of welfare has to supply some convincing arguments, since at rst glance it seems absurd. Prima facie it may look cruel, illegal or even impossible to oblige very young, very old, child-bearing or sick people to work in return for the benets they receive. In such cases a legitimation may simply be lacking, hence such persons might still be`subsidized' by public funds without work requirements.
But there is yet another class of people. In former poor laws, 5 persons not willing to work but lacking the means to support themselves were called`undeserving poor' (Katz 1990 )the`able-bodied' presumably could work if they wanted to and were therefore denied the right to assistance. Given that enough jobs are available (for many periods an odd assumption), such persons might have their subtle reasons for not wanting to work. So let us call them the`sensitive' (Arneson 1997, 19) 10 The debate about scal results is still ongoing, and philosophers are not in a position to make long-term judgements in this regard.
But the point remains:`General welfare' arguments remain contested even in monetary terms.
It does not help, as economists like Gary Becker would have it, to allow for non-monetary aspects of welfare such as individual wellbeing. Is a person's wellbeing necessarily increased by forcing him to work? One might note the dierence between`working' and`working compulsory' in this regard. Working surely can be fun, but being forced to work much less so. If the person does not necessarily gain pleasure of whatever kind through being forced to work, it is hard to see how his family, associates or even the employers should. This can be taken to the macro-level: Does a society`fare well' if it uses force and lowers wages? This is at least contestable. And a mere hope that it might have the desired eect is not enough to justify severe political reforms.
Nevertheless, classic authors like John Locke or Jeremy Bentham made eorts to justify workfare (or its predecessor, the workhouse) on economic grounds, and this approach is still taken.
11 So, to simplify matters let us assume that there is an overall economic benet. Would this justify workfare? Not yet, I would argue.
There need to be other reasons, because there is a high price to pay. We noted that there are dierences within the nonworking population. Some cannot work, others do not want to work. If we force somebody to work against his will, 12 this does not only mean to penalize him or her economically. We also infringe upon his or her freedom. And that is not a small problem: Within liberal societies this goes against a basic rule. Freedom is not a commodity that can be overruled by nancial considerations. J.S. Mill has famously expressed this as follows:
The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sucient warrant.
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Even less so, we may add, is the good of others. Since freedom is a necessary condition for the market society, liberalism would contradict itself if it would constrain anybody's freedom for economic reasons only. If some have concluded that workfare is illiberal, this is certainly true for its economic justication.
14 To justify force with the good of others would go against another liberal creed, according to Kant:
Whatever has a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; on the other hand, whatever is above all price, and therefore admits of no equivalent, has a dignity.
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If the freedom of some citizens would be infringed for economic reasons, this would violate their dignity. So there must be other reasons.
Among non-economic cases made, moral arguments rank prominently. Some of them can again be excluded: Stuart White (2003; , for one, has argued that workfare is founded upon the notion of`reciprocity', which he interprets as an explication of the term`justice'. I think he is mistaken on two levels:
First, social rightswhich are still presupposed for workfaredo not have to bè earned'. Even if conservative authors may wish to do away with`entitlements'
11 We shall be able to work cheaper than any of our neighbors, all the poor`s labor being clear prot (Kent 1694 , see Locke 1697 Castel 1998, 65f.) . The gain in the gross domestic product can be estimated at 1,9% or e 38,4 billion. (Sinn 2003, ix) 12 completely (Murray 1984) , they have not yet succeeded. And rightly so: A crucial point is missed if we treat workfare in terms of a private contract or society as a large company. Welfare (and by implication it's metamorphosis, too, however defective in other respects) deals with social spheres beyond the market. Not only is it of limited practical use to re-enter market categories where the market has failed already, it is also a categorical mistake. If I cannot`buy' a social right in the rst place (see Kant above), I cannot be made to pay for it afterwards.
Nothing in the rights talk justies a`payback' (Arneson 1997, 15) .
Secondly I disagree with White's use of the term`reciprocity'. Again he misses the point: The reason many scholars adopted this term from ethnology is due to the challenge it poses to western economic thinking. It does designate some sort of exchange, but compared to standard market exchangebuying a good and paying for it right awayit is much more exible concerning time, actors and goods. Not necessarily the receiver of the initial gift is supposed to pay back, but somebody else from his community may make remunerations, may return the gift later and even in another currency (Goodin 2002; Bruni 2008 16 It should be kept in mind that people do not normally object to government taxation when the money is used to promote the common good. (Wall 1998, 201; cf. Goodin 1988, 312f.; Gewirth 1978, 254, 315f.) 2. Perfectionism and Liberalism
In the literature that pushed for welfare reform, one particular argument gures prominently. Its perspective focused not on the morality of political actions, but on the morality of the recipients. The main idea is that`welfare as we knew it' (Bill Clinton) degenerated and demoralised the recipients (see Wilson 1995) .
The story goes like this: Because they do not work, they remain poor and lose their self-respect. But, thanks to welfare, they can survive, but also have no incentive to take up work any longer. They get used to a life of idleness, maybe even of delinquency (McWhorter 2006) . Therefore the reform is praised as an eort in reactive character formation. Recipients are expected to regain their self-reliance' if forced to work (Solow 1998). Self-reliance serves both as an end (an intrinsic value) and a means to develop further valuable character traits.
This reasoning was rightly called`perfectionist' (Wol 2004 ): The state is called on to promote a particular`conception of the good', the moral quality of persons.
These persons are in turn obliged to develop into more valuable citizens.
All of these are perfectionist assumptions. Obviously, this is an eort to legislate morality, and for that, it is dubious.
17 At a rst glance, this policy seems illiberal and paternalistic: The state is no longer`neutral', as liberalism demands, and it directly infringes upon citizens' freedom. But this judgement might be too hasty. Workfarists may escape this criticism by denying welfare recipients'`free will'.
18 The whole point of paternalist measures is that autonomy needs to be initiated rst. The language of`activation', which is common in welfare reform, clearly expresses this view.
19 What is not yet there cannot be hurt; it can only be developed. And there seems to be nothing wrong with developing autonomy.
In fact this is a perfectionist goal, at least for western societies (Raz 1986).
So we have to ask: Is workfare an appropriate translation of perfectionism into politics? And if it is, and we reject workfare because of its illiberalism, does this necessarily lead to a rejection of perfectionism? I want to argue against both assumptions. For this, we will rst have a closer look at perfectionism, before we look for the underlying social philosophies that seem to permit workfare in the last chapter.
The literature on political perfectionism has proliferated in recent years, but the idea is much older. Perfectionism from Aristotle onwards maintained that the`human good' consists neither of moral behaviour nor pleasure per se, but is rather a happy or`ourishing' life considered as a whole. It may contain both pleasure and morality, yet more important characteristics are the fullment of activities over a lasting period and deep personal relations. If the enabling of such a good life is used as a criterion for`good institutions,' we speak of political 17 Any attempt to regulate the moral character of welfare recipients was an unjust case of legislating morality' (Sandel 1996, 286; cf. Standing 1999) .
18 Those who cannot manage their aairs well enough to remain independent are necessarily unfree. They will inevitably be governed, however permissively, by the programs on which they rely. (Mead 1986, 42) 19 Lessenich 2008 . Morals trump economic considerations: even if workfare initiatives were expensive for the welfare state, they should be chosen politically due to their ethical productivity. (Kersting 2002, 49, transl. CH) For when we are barraged by images of casual sex and routine violence and when our manners are unrestrained, our streets lthy, and our language imprecise and undiscriminating, the cumulative eect is to degrade our capacity to discern, and a fortiori to respond to, many of the subtle reasons that our situations provide. As a result, our eorts to achieve our fundamental goals are systematically thwarted and our lives correspondingly worsened. (Sher 1997, 213) The positive approach contains a risk: We may favour particular ways of living over others; say soccer over baseball or classical over popular music.
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In its extreme this can become illiberal, say if one religion was privileged or made mandatory, or if a whole society subscribed to particular values, such as heroic ones (think of Sparta). Alternatively the state may try to help build the general capacity to lead a self-determined and meaningful life, whatever it contains. This would result in promoting personal`autonomy' (Pauer-Studer 2000) . Such an autonomy-bolstering perfectionism would not per se be illiberal.
So Rawls' point (that the state should be`neutral') can be accepted for every particular conception of the good, yet the conditions to lead a meaningful and self-determined life may still be promoted, because it does not prescribe any particular conception of the good.
24 The decisive question for the degree of liberalism' is the way autonomy is spelled out in detail.
It is useful to interpret personal autonomy as the condition for all kinds of meaningful life: (Signicantly) autonomous persons are those who can shape their life and determine its course, and are thus part creators of their own moral world (Raz 1986, 154; cf. Christman 2005) . Nevertheless, though autonomy is a very general concept, it is only valid for certain forms of life (Raz calls them`western industrial') as distinguished from others; say, life in small religious 23 Governments should favor some ways of life over others (Wall 1998, 207) . Raz allows for the cultivation of certain tastes (Raz 1986, 422; cf. Sher 1997, 246) , others want to provide certain art institutions (Hurka 1993, 174) .
24 In his later theory Rawls included autonomy (1993, 77f.) and a moderate perfectionism (362). For perfectionists, personal autonomy is more than a moral category: it includes the ability to lead a meaningful life (Wall 1998, 127f. A standard example for political promotion of character is mandatory schooling (not necessarily by state schools). If it is a prerequisite for every citizen to be able to read, write, calculate, speak the language, and know the law and history of the country, then it is justied to spend public money to achieve this end, and to enforce that everybody goes to school (Wall 1998, 207 This argument would probably not convince a liberal. The learning argument cannot be extended to adults, as educating adults presupposes their consent.
Obviously, not developing one's own objective good cannot be interpreted as à harm to others' (see Mill above). If I do not speak Chinese, although I had the chance and ability to learn it, somebody might regret it for various reasons, but there is no moral justication to force me to learn it. The fact that somebody could develop further abilities (say by regular sports activities) still does not justify an obligation (Hurka 1993, 155f.) . Even if the intentions were good, the consequences of such eorts probably would not be: It is unlikely that forcing people to act against their will would`better' them in a signicant way. It is much more likely that the means taken would counteract the end (Dworkin 2000, 268) .
In addition, whereas individual autonomy is established progressively, by measure (think of someone developing the ability to refuse the demands of others), such a process of development is not visible to the state. The state can only discriminate between autonomous and non-autonomous adults. There is no room in politics for arguments to enhance autonomy. If a state decided to force its citizens to engage in sporting activities, this would only suggest that it considers them irrational and immature.
27 But not every lazy (or sensitive) citizen has lost control over him/herself, as drug addicts or psychotics may have.
The plain fact that citizens might reasonably object to this obligation indicates that they already act autonomously.
28 So it is hard for a liberal state to justify force which risks missing the intended consequences and abuses its citizens.
A better way out for the liberal perfectionist is to claim that a society should oer its citizens opportunities to ourishsay: to engage in regular sporting activities, to learn another language or to play an instrument, or to retrain for a jobwithout forcing them to do so. Such a method avoids the dangers of imposing paternalistic obligation. On the other hand, it is a valid claim, as it adds something to liberalism plain and simple: It follows that society should provide the necessary resources for those who under normal conditions would not be able to aord them. To quote Sher again:
27 [P] aternalistic intervention must be justied by the evident failure or absence of reason and will and must be guided [...] by what is known about the subject's more permanent aims.
( Rawls 1971, 220f.) 28 At least if we use Sher's account of autonomy as self-direction on the basis of good reasons (1997, 148) .
If autonomy is a central component of a fully good life, and if we ought to accept the general thesis of perfectionism, then it would follow that political authorities should take an active role in creating and maintaining social conditions that help their subjects realize this ideal. (1997, 131) Liberal perfectionism may engage in bolstering autonomy by positively promoting autonomy-related goods if opportunities to develop these skills are provided, but the state abstains from making them obligatory for adults.
29 As always in politics, there is a price to pay: What if some adults really were immature?
For them, such opportunities (say, a public library to the pathological couch potato) would be meaningless as long as they lack the necessary capacities to live a self-determined life. But given that for epistemic reasons we never know for sure whether the average person is behaving autonomously, in a Millian framework this is a price worth paying. An`underperformer' surely does not hurt anybody by not living up to his abilities. Watching television is not a vice per se. A couch potato can even become an expert in lm history and IT-technology by downloading movies online. This is an excellence of its own. So why should we force him to read Tolstoy?
Liberal perfectionism does not provide justications for paternalism. Following Rawls and others, there are illiberal`traps' perfectionism needs to avoid, such as politically promoting a particular conception of the good that excludes or disadvantages others, or forcing adults to engage in certain activities, for even if these activities are considered autonomy-enhancing this still compromises the freedom of those forced and may even be harmful to them. But this does not mean that perfectionism and liberalism are incompatible. Liberal scepticism can be met if perfectionist politics provide opportunities and resources to develop autonomy without making them obligatory for adults. Since liberalism has to rely on autonomy, such politics should be in the interest of liberalism.
The Social Philosophy of Welfare
If we were interested in principles only, we could close here. But we are dealing with the real world, and there is one more paradox to solve. We started by looking for possible justications for workfare, amongst which perfectionism loomed prominent. Then we showed that liberalism only allows for certain forms of autonomy-enhancing politics and that it would be illiberal to use force on adults in the promotion of their own good. Applied to workfare, such practices must be considered illiberal. As long as we endorse liberalism they are not justi- Dependency, as used in the welfare context, is not simply being poor.
It is not simply being out of work. Rather, welfare dependency is a problem of attitude, a moral failure to have the proper work ethic. (Handler/Hasenfeld 1997, 9; see Mead 1986, 48) If people rely on benets as a means of survival, so the story goes, over time they will lose their work ethics (because there is no need to work any longer), and as a consequence their self-respect:
The welfare society creates dependent people lacking in self-respect, who are willing to sell their birthright of personal autonomy of pride for a bowl of lentils from the public kitchen. (Margalit 1996, 224) If mothers pass on these traits to their children this supposedly leads to à culture of poverty'.
32 If people are no longer autonomous they cannot be blamed, so part of the blame must be attributed to politicians and administrators who were too`permissive' (Mead 1986) . Following this logic, before citizens can be reformed, welfare needs to be.
30 Mead 1986; Murray 1984; cf. the criticism in Shragge 1997; Candeias 2004; King 2005 and Wyss 2007. 31 Gewirth 1996, 128., 231.; Gutmann/Thompson 1996, 291.; Dworkin 2000, 320.; White 2004; in German Kersting 2000, 374f.; Hoee 2004, 28f .. Sceptical, but not principally opposed is Arneson 1997; 32 Ronald Reagans prejudice was that`welfare queens' (single black mothers collecting welfare) drive Cadillacs to collect their welfare checks (Hancocks 2004) . For the`culture of poverty'
see Himmelfarb 1984, 307.. The positive argument then is that work, and only work, can undo these moral deprivations. It is for this reason that, in the new workfare philosophy, force is justied:
The obligation of welfare recipients to work [...] works against the downgrading and demotivation of long-term unemployed connected with the old forms of unemployment and social assistance. The skills necessary for a regular job can be acquired or reacquired through community employment, among them being punctuality, reliability, social behaviour and the ability to work over an extended period.
( Sinn 2003, 46) In order for this argument to work there can be no other means to that end. Otherwise it would not be possible to enforce work. Two arguments are linked here: Autonomy trumps liberty, and work engenders autonomy; thus work requirements trump liberty. So in theory, forcing people to work takes on the appearance of a golden path`from dependency to autonomy' (Keheler 1990 ).
But this is sucient justication only if we accept the assumption that work and only work engenders autonomy.
There are two ways to apply the autonomy-enhancing argument to the philosophy of work, neither of which is adequate. Autonomy can be understood as an absolute threshold or as a property that is attained gradually. In the`either or'-scenario the argument would appear as follows:
1. In a liberal society everybody should be autonomous.
2. Political institutions have to`make' non-autonomous persons autonomous.
3. Work is a necessary condition for being autonomous.
4. Persons on welfare do not work and are therefore not autonomous.
5. Forcing them to work is the best means to achieve (2).
What is wrong with this scenario? Once we accept perfectionism and allow autonomy to trump liberty, there is no problem with sentences 1 and 2: If autonomy is an objective (and actor-neutral) good, than everybody should be able to enjoy it and the state should provide the means necessary for attainment. 33 Governments are subject to autonomy-based duties to provide the conditions of autonomy for people who lack them. (Raz 1986, 415) that all of them do: Imagine, for example, an underground artist who is on welfare, but organises festivals and writes poetry. Providing somebody with economic means does not strip him of his autonomy. Otherwise every nonworking spouse would have to be considered non-autonomous; a claim that is obviously absurd.
Thus empirically 3 and 4 are false.
This notion rests on a misunderstanding of autonomy. An important`reason for welfare' was to allow for autonomy.
34 To be able to resist family or market pressures is a necessary element for leading a self-determined life: State action to relieve indigence enhances liberty as autonomy (Barry 1999, 25) . The term autonomy cannot be reduced to economic dimensions only. By contrast, work can be an obstacle to personal developmentand even more so being forced to work.
Nothing guarantees that work always produces autonomy: First, if autonomous people work, this does not mean that work causes the autonomy. Second, as we saw, people can work and be non-autonomous, for example if they have no choice but to work in a job they do not like or which even harms them (think of sweat shops). So for empirical reasons conclusion 5 must be rejected, considering the persons (who may be autonomous or not, whatever their work status), the eects of welfare (which can make one more autonomous) and of work (which can make one dependent). Because work is not the only and not necessarily a reliable autonomy provider, 5 is not justied. This is straightforward.
The gradual scenario is a bit more complicated. The argument runs as follows:
1. In liberal societies everybody should be as autonomous as possible.
2. Political institutions have to`make' citizens more autonomous.
3. Work is the only way to become more autonomous.
4. Persons on welfare do not work and are therefore not autonomous enough.
5. Forcing them to work is the best means to achieve (2). Cf. Plant 1980; Goodin 1988, 306; 1999, 125., 211.; Vobruba 1997. 35 The welfare reform is at the same time meant to be a reform of the labor market, see Grell et al. 2002 . Ideally people should get back into the labor market as soon as possible, so wage labor clearly is the model for workfare.
36 Take Hume: poverty and hard labour debase the minds of the common people, and render them unt for any science and ingenious profession. (1742, I.XXI.3) Frederic Taylor asked for workers with the intelligence of an ox (see Castel 1998; Frambach 1999; Muirwood 2004 If, within the scope of the problem, you do not allow for any entities other than bad characters and increasing poverty, it is easy to conclude that paternalism is the only way out. But there is no reason for dismissing every other logic and explanation from the start.
Social theory has a lot to say about systematic problems of work in capitalist societies (such as theories of involuntary unemployment, to mention but one).
Once they are taken into account, as I have tried to do, the whole picture changes.
If the liberal credo of`equal liberty' is taken seriously, the boundaries to political interferences set by the harm principle have to be extended to the sphere of work, too. Once scrutinised, the perfectionist justication for workfare no longer holds.
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